In response to this adverse publicity, and for the purpose of maintaining and increasing its sales and profits, Nike and the individual defendants made statements to the California consuming public that plaintiff alleges were false and misleading. Specifically, Nike and the individual defendants said that workers who make Nike products are protected from physical and sexual abuse, that they are paid in accordance with applicable local laws and regulations governing wages and hours, that they are paid on average double the applicable local minimum wage, that they receive a "living wage," that they receive free meals and health care, and that their working conditions are in compliance with applicable local laws and regulations governing occupational health and safety. Nike and the individual defendants made these [27 Cal. 4th 948] statements in press releases, in letters to newspapers, in a letter to university presidents and athletic directors, and in other documents distributed for public relations purposes. Nike also bought full-page advertisements in leading newspapers to publicize a report that GoodWorks International, LLC., had prepared under a contract with Nike. The report was based on an investigation by former United States Ambassador Andrew Young, and it found no evidence of illegal or unsafe working conditions at Nike factories in China, Vietnam, and Indonesia.
Circuit Wizard 2 Full Version Free 27
In speaking to consumers about working conditions in the factories where its products are made, Nike engaged in speech that is particularly hardy or durable. Because Nike's purpose in making these statements, at least as alleged in the first amended complaint, was to maintain its sales and profits, regulation aimed at preventing false and actually or inherently misleading speech is unlikely to deter Nike from speaking truthfully or at all about the conditions in its factories. To the extent that application of these laws may make Nike more cautious, and cause it to make greater efforts to verify the [27 Cal. 4th 964] truth of its statements, these laws will serve the purpose of commercial speech protection by "insuring that the stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as freely." (Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, supra, 425 U.S. at pp. 772.)
While Nike's critics have taken full advantage of their right to " 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' " debate (Garrison, supra, 379 U.S. at p. 75), the same cannot be said of Nike, the object of their ire. [27 Cal. 4th 971] When Nike tries to defend itself from these attacks, the majority denies it the same First Amendment protection Nike's critics enjoy. Why is this, according to the majority? Because Nike competes not only in the marketplace of ideas, but also in the marketplace of manufactured goods. And because Nike sells shoes--and its defense against critics may help sell those shoes--the majority asserts that Nike may not freely engage in the debate, but must run the risk of lawsuits under California's unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200 et seq.) and false advertising law (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17500 et seq.), should it ever make a factual claim that turns out to be inaccurate. According to the majority, if Nike utters a factual misstatement, unlike its critics, it may be sued for restitution, civil penalties, and injunctive relief under these sweeping statutes. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 949-951.)
" 'the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.' [Citation.]" (Thomas, supra, 323 U.S. at p. 532, quoting Thornhill, supra, 310 U.S. at p. 102.) Nike, which came to the forefront of the international labor abuse debate, provided relevant information about its labor practices in its overseas plants. [27 Cal. 4th 977] Nike's speech, in an attempt to influence public opinion on economic globalization and international labor rights and working conditions, gave the public insight and perspective into the debate. This speech should be fully protected as "essential to free government." (Thornhill, supra, 310 U.S. at p. 95.)
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court, like a wizard trained at Hogwarts, waved its wand and "plucked the commercial doctrine out of thin [27 Cal. 4th 978] air." (Kozinski & Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech (1990) 76 Va. L.Rev. 627, 627.) Unfortunately, the court's doctrinal wizardry has created considerable confusion over the past 60 years as it has struggled to define the difference between commercial and noncommercial speech. The United States Supreme Court has, in recent years, acknowledged "the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category." (City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. (1993) 507 U.S. 410, 419 (Discovery Network).) After tracing the various definitions of commercial speech used over the years, the court conceded that no "categorical definition of the difference between" commercial and noncommercial speech exists. (Id. at pp. 420-423.) Instead, the difference is a matter of " 'common[]sense' " (Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn. (1978) 436 U.S. 447, 455-456 (Ohralik)), and restrictions on speech "must be examined carefully to ensure that speech deserving of greater constitutional protection is not inadvertently suppressed." (Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. (1983) 463 U.S. 60, 66, fn. omitted (Bolger).) Consistent with these pronouncements, the United States Supreme Court has expressly refused to define the elements of commercial speech. (See id. at p. 67, fn. 14.) Indeed, "the impossibility of specifying the parameters that define the category of commercial speech has haunted its jurisprudence and scholarship." (Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech (2000) 48 UCLA L.Rev. 1, 7.)
Third, the test violates the First Amendment by stifling the ability of speakers engaged in commerce, such as corporations, to participate in debates over public issues. The United States Supreme Court has broadly defined public issues as those issues "about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." (Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U.S. 88, 102.) "The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled . . . ." (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 269 (New York Times).) "[S]peech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,' and is entitled to special protection" (Connick v. Myers (1983) 461 U.S. 138, 145), [27 Cal. 4th 983] because such speech "is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government" (Garrison v. Louisiana (1964) 379 U.S. 64, 74-75). "The First and Fourteenth Amendments remove 'governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity . . . .' " (Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York (1980) 447 U.S. 530, 534 (Consolidated Edison), quoting Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15, 24.) Thus, the First Amendment "both fully protects and implicitly encourages" public debate on " 'matters of public concern.' " (Pacific Gas & Electric, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 9 (plur. opn. of Powell, J.), quoting Thornill v. Alabama, supra, 310 U.S. at p. 101.)
Finding that the commercial elements of the union representative's speech should be accorded the full protection of the First Amendment, the court concluded that distinguishing between the speech's commercial and noncommercial elements "offers no security for free discussion." (Thomas v. Collins, supra, 323 U.S. at p. 535.) "In these conditions," making such a distinction "blankets with uncertainty whatever may be said. It compels the speaker to hedge and trim." (Ibid.) "When legislation or its application can confine labor leaders on such occasions to innocuous and abstract discussion of the virtues of trade unions and so becloud even this with doubt, uncertainty and the risk of penalty, freedom of speech for them will be at an end. A restriction so destructive of the right of public discussion . . . is incompatible with the freedoms secured by the First Amendment." (Id. at pp. 536-537.) [27 Cal. 4th 990]
Designing printed circuit boards (PCBs) for audio and other projects can be an exercise in frustration when you're first starting out. Part of this stems from the user-unfriendly nature of a lot of the available PCB design packages out there - even ones that cost a lot of money. I have recently been using the free, open-source program FreePCB for PCB layout. I really like this program a lot. It is very easy to learn and use and has well-written documentation including a tutorial. The FreePCB web site has a friendly support forum, as well as download links for the software and its documentation. Its user interface is effective and allows you to get work done quickly. However, this program does not have a schematic capture facility. It's assumed that you already have a netlist, which you import and use to create the PC board. This is because the main program is the work of one person, Allan Wright. This concentration on PCB layout alone means that what the program does, it does very well. By working through the tutorial, you'll see that the user interface design has features that are specifically created to maximize productivity. Maximum board size is 60 by 60 inches, and the number of copper layers can be as large as 16. This means you can create complex boards with professional quality.
This leaves the issue of what to use for schematic capture. I'm not very familiar with the available standalone schematic capture programs out there, but one popular one is is the freeware TinyCAD. However, I am a regular user of the freeware SPICE simulator from Linear Technology called LTspice. As part of a recent project, I had done a full simulation of a circuit containing about 100 components and needed to make a PCB of the design. One possibility would have been to redraw the schematic from scratch in a standalone schematic capture program. I had heard that it was possible to export a netlist from LTspice and import it into FreePCB. However, the available information on how to make this work was very sketchy. The LTspice documentation on netlist export is sparse. I was too lazy to redraw the schematic in a separate schematic editor, and I was also worried that in doing so I might introduce wiring errors in my design. So I decided to see if I could make the netlist export from LTspice work for this task. In this way, the netlist would be created from a schematic that had been checked for errors to the extent that the simulations run correctly. This page describes the things I found along the way that were necessary to make the whole process work without errors in the resulting PCB. If you decide to use LTspice and FreePCB together, following the steps here will prevent you from making some of the same errors that I did at the start. 2ff7e9595c
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